Причины промышленной революции

[vlyerm]

http://uzhas-sovka.livejournal.com/2082123.html?thread=20249931

Широко известный(ая) в кругах экономистов МакКлоски выпустил(а) новую книжку
с названием

Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World

Рекомендую, книжка из числа редкой в наше время классики мысли.
Последовательно разрушаются типичные в массовом сознании мифы и легенды о том,
почему случилась промышленная революция,
даже из числа преподаваемых с высоких амвонов.

Содержание такое, в принципе если хотя бы это заучить и понять, уже огромная польза человечеству

1: The Industrial Revolution was a Great Tide.
2. The Tide Came from a New Dignity and a New Liberty for the Ordinary Bourgeoisie and Its Innovations.
3: Many Other Plausible Stories Don’t Work Very Well.
4: The Correct Story Praises “Capitalism.” 36
5: Modern Growth was a Factor of at Least Sixteen. 42
6: Increasing Scope, Not Pot-of-Pleasure “Happiness,” is What Mattered.
7. And the Poor Won. 57
8: Britain Led, 64
9: But Britain’s, and Europe’s, Lead was an Episode, 78
10. And Followers Could Leap Over Stages. 87
11: It Didn’t Happen Because of Thrift, 95
12: Nor Because of a Rise of Greed or of a Protestant Ethic, 106
13: Nor Because of Original Accumulation. 116
14: Transport or Other Domestic Reshufflings Didn’t Cause It, 127
15: Nor Geography, nor Natural Resources, 135
16: Not Even Coal. 141
17: Foreign Trade was Not the Cause, Though World Prices were a Context, 150
18. And the Logic of Trade-as-an-Engine is Dubious, 159
19: And Even the Dynamic Effects of Trade were Small. 164
20: The Effects on Europe of the Slave Trade and British Imperialism were Smaller Still, 177
21: And Other Imperialisms, External or Internal, Were Equally Profitless. 185
22: It was Not the Sheer Quickening of Commerce. 193
23: Eugenic Materialism Doesn’t Work, 204
24: Neo-Darwinism Doesn’t Compute, 213
25: And Inheritance Fades. 220
26: Institutions Cannot be Viewed Merely as Incentive-Providing Constraints, 228
27: And So the Better Institutions, Such as Those Alleged for 1689, Don’t Explain, 236
28: And Anyway the Entire Absence of Property is not Relevant to the Place or Period, 248
29: And the Chronology of Property and Incentives has been Mismeasured, 257
30: And So the Routine of Max U Doesn’t Work. 264
31: The Cause was Not Science, 271
32: But Bourgeois Dignity and Liberty Entwined with the Enlightenment. 279
33: It was Not Allocation, but Language. 287
34: Dignity and Liberty for Ordinary People, in Short, were the Greatest Externalities. 297

Ключевой абзац

The negative case here, summarizing fifty years of research by economic and
historical scientists, is:
Foreign trade was too small and too prevalent worldwide to explain the rising tide in
northwestern Europe. Capital accumulation was not crucial, since it is pretty easily
supplied. Coal can be and was moved. Empires did not enrich the imperial countries,
despite what you may think, and anyway the chronology is wrong, and anyway
imperialism was commonplace in earlier times. Likewise, the institutions of property rights
were established many centuries before industrialization. Greed didn’t increase in the West.
In bourgeois countries during the Industrial Revolution the Catholics did just as well as did
the Protestants. The Muslims and the Hindus and the Buddhists, or for that matter the
Confucians and most of the animists, thought as rationally about profit and loss as did the
Christians. Populations had grown in earlier times and other places. Until the eighteenth
century many parts of the Far and Near and Southern East were as rich, and appeared to be
as ready for innovation, as parts of the West—except at length in the crucial matters of the
dignity and liberty of the bourgeoisie. Until the seventeenth century the Chinese and the
Arabs practiced a science more sophisticated than the one the Europeans practiced. The
science of the Scientific Revolution was in any case mostly about prisms and planets, and
before the late nineteenth century even its other branches did not much help in worldly
pursuits


In short, the Europeans were not
economically special until about 1700. They showed most plainly their special ingenuity,
along with their special brutality, only briefly in the two centuries after 1800. By the early
twenty-first century they had reverted to not being special at all, even in brutality. The
episode of their innovative specialness, and the rising tide, came from a change in their
economic rhetoric. It made all the difference.


Воспитанном на советском баранам, конечно, чрезвычайно сложно усвоить этот
критически важный факт - слово, произнесенное свободно и с достоинством,
двигает вселенную ровно туда, куда носитель
слова пожелает.

С запретом свободы слова или лишением носителя слова его личного
достоинства останавливается и тухнет мертвечиной все, несмотря
ни на ресурсы, ни на институты, ни на капиталы и банки.

[Lyss]

хм, вначале было слово...

демагогия одним словом

[vladimir_r]

В списке 125 наиболее актуальных научных проблем современности (лень искать ссылку, где-то тут мелькала, кажется) есть и такая: "Норвегия и Нигерия обладают сходными ресурсами. Почему в одной наблюдается экономическое развитие, а в другой - нет." 

[ola_nag]

В списке 125 наиболее актуальных научных проблем современности (лень искать ссылку, где-то тут мелькала, кажется) есть и такая: "Норвегия и Нигерия обладают сходными ресурсами. Почему в одной наблюдается экономическое развитие, а в другой - нет." 

думаю дело в зарождении банковской системы, как системы.

[Flammar]

Скалигеровщина в качестве аргументов есть демагогия. Если верить сайту livehistory, ЧТО ВООБЩЕ может быть с достаточной степенью достоверности известно и временах до 1700?

[Flammar]

Думаю, причина того, что нам кажется, что была "промышленная революция" - это скалигеровская хронологическая аберрация.